INTRODUCTION
The codification of the substantive law of jurisdiction in the CJPTA 1 must be viewed not only from the perspective of Canadian private international law but also from that of international efforts to coordinate the law of jurisdiction and foreign judgments. Most prominent among these are the projects of the Hague Conference on Private International Law. These include a failed attempt at a convention to deal both with jurisdiction and with foreign judgments (1999) (2000) (2001) ; a promulgated convention on Choice of Court Agreements (2005); a new attempt, currently under way, to develop a convention on recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments without any direct rules on jurisdiction; and a foreshadowed attempt to develop a separate convention with direct rules on jurisdiction. A brief history of these evolutions is necessary.
The earliest attempt to develop a comprehensive convention on the recognition and enforcement of civil judgments began with a decision of the Conference in 1960 2 and culminated in the Convention of 1 February 1971 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters. 3 This convention attracted no adherents, partly because of its complexity and partly because the European countries had developed the Brussels Convention, 4 which successfully covered the field within the European Communities. Although some Canadian common law jurisdictional rules would change if Canada becomes a party. Most notably, "strong cause" would no longer be a ground for taking jurisdiction despite the clause. Art 6 limits the ability to take jurisdiction in the face of an exclusive contractual choice of another court. If the choice of court agreement is contractually valid, taking jurisdiction is only possible if giving effect to the agreement would "lead to a manifest injustice or would be manifestly contrary to public policy" of the forum, or the agreement cannot be reasonably performed, or the chosen court will not hear the case (para (c)-(e), respectively). See the provisions setting out the conditions of, and defences to, recognition and enforcement of a judgment of the chosen court. Many of those provisions have been carried over, mutatis mutandis, into the current project on a general convention on the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters.
The current project dates from 2011, when, at the instigation of the Permanent Bureau, the Hague Conference appointed an Experts' Group to consider further work on a judgments project. That group recommended that work be undertaken on a recognition and enforcement convention, including jurisdictional filters. This recommendation led to a Working Group, which in 2015 produced a proposed draft text of a convention. 17 The Working Group's draft went to a Special Commission that met in June 2016 and reworked it. The result was published as the Special Commission's "2016 Preliminary Draft Convention". 18 The Special Commission met again and revised the 2016 draft into the "February 2017 Draft Convention", 19 which is the latest indication of what a convention might look like. Confidence seems high that a final version can be achieved. The Special Commission has tentatively scheduled a third session in November 2017 and it has recommended that a Diplomatic Conference may be convened towards the end of 2018 or early 2019. 20 So the prospects seem good that a traité simple form of convention will emerge, with "jurisdictional filters" but no direct rules on taking jurisdiction. Nevertheless, despite the fiasco of 1999-2001, the ambition to create a jurisdiction convention lives on. The Council of the Hague Conference resolved in March 2016 that, once the Special Commission had drawn up a draft recognition and enforcement convention, the Experts' Group would be convened again, this time to consider "matters relating to direct jurisdiction (including exorbitant grounds and lis pendens / declining jurisdiction)" with a view to "preparing an additional instrument". 21 The Council reiterated this plan in March 2017.
22
Whether anything comes of such further consideration seems highly uncertain. If a convention along the lines of the February 2017 Hague draft does materialize and is reasonably widely adopted, it is far from clear how much value a convention on "direct jurisdiction" would add to the international litigation system. 23 If a judgments convention does not materialize or -probably the greater risk -is not widely taken up, it is hard to see a jurisdiction convention, which we know from experience is a much greater challenge, being viable at all.
THE CJPTA AND THE HAGUE PROJECTS
The main question about the CJPTA and the Hague projects is whether the CJPTA's rules might cause difficulty in the event that Canada becomes a party to the judgments convention currently being negotiated. This convention is already taking fairly clear shape, and, as noted, the chances that the negotiations will succeed seem good. If they do, and if the convention is adopted by Canada (probably province by province 24 ) and by a number of Canada's trading partners, the relationship between the CJPTA regime and the jurisdictional criteria in the convention will become a matter of great practical importance.
A separate Hague jurisdiction convention is a remoter prospect. Such a convention may one day see the light of day, but the jurisdictional principles in the 1999 and 2001 drafts elicited little consensus at the time, and it is doubtful whether they would elicit any more now. If a new jurisdiction convention eventually emerges, it is almost certainly going to look very different from these drafts. Nevertheless, I
21
Hague Conference on Private International Law, Council on General Affairs and Policy of the Conference (15-17 March 2016), Conclusions and Recommendations Adopted by the Council, online: Hague Conference on Private International Law <https://assets.hcch.net/docs/679bd42c-f974-461a-8e1a-31e1b51eda10.pdf> at para 13. The Council "confirmed that this is a priority project" (ibid at para 14).
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Hague Conference on Private International Law, Council on General Affairs and Policy of the Conference (14-16 March 2017), Conclusions and Recommendations Adopted by the Council, supra note 20 at para. 7.
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If litigants know what jurisdictional grounds entitle an eventual judgment to be recognized or enforced in another country, and having the judgment recognized or enforced matters to them, their choice of where to litigate is accordingly circumscribed. There might still be jurisdictional contests and manoeuvring because their could be more than one forum that complies with the recognition rules (e.g., to take two from the February 2017 Hague draft, the defendant's habitual residence and the place where the defendant's tortious conduct took place). Here a separate jurisdiction convention might help by, for instance, providing a lis pendens rule. Where parties do not care about whether an eventual judgment will be enforceable, the range of possible jurisdictional struggles is larger, and a jurisdiction convention in principle would help by reining in broad jurisdictional rules and providing an agreed set of rules to deal with multiple forums and parallel proceedings. The benefits from doing all that, however, are much harder to evaluate than the benefits from an agreed set of rules for recognizing and enforcing judgments. One reason is that it is hard to assess how successfully, on the whole, the problem of competing jurisdictions is already addressed through the current decentralized international system, in which each country controls its own courts' ability to take or decline jurisdiction if there are other available forums.
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February 2017 Hague draft, art 28, the now familiar "federal state clause" that enables a state to declare that the convention extends to all its territorial units or only to some of them. The declaration to limit application to certain units must be made when the state becomes a party but may be modified subsequently. The jurisdictional grounds approved in the February 2017 Hague draft are a relatively short list, which is not surprising, given that the participants in the Special Commission, from a wide range of countries, could all agree on them. A judgment from a court that had jurisdiction on one of these grounds would have to be recognized or enforced. The convention's regime would not be exclusive; a state would be free to have its courts recognize judgments on jurisdictional grounds accepted in its national recognition and enforcement rules even if those judgments did not qualify under the convention. 25 The convention would apply only if both the state of origin and the requested state were parties to the convention. 
SUBJECT MATTER ISSUES
Before looking in detail at how the CJPTA compares with the jurisdictional provisions in the February 2017 Hague draft, it is worth noting some aspects of the Hague regime relating to subject matter.
The CJPTA has no provisions that exclude any subject matter from its scope, but some subject matters are indirectly excluded because court jurisdiction in relation to them is dealt with in another statute, whether provincial or federal. 27 The scope of the February 2017 Hague draft, as of the Hague project from the beginning, is limited to "civil or commercial matters". 28 Revenue matters are expressly excluded as not being civil or commercial. 29 A fairly long list of subject matters that are definitely or arguably civil or commercial are also excluded. The details are not material for the present purpose. Among others, they embrace the status and capacity of natural persons, family matters, succession, insolvency, carriage of passengers and goods, and the validity, nullity or dissolution of corporations and other entities. 30 A notable exclusion is defamation, 31 because it implicates freedom of expression and may have constitutional implications.
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The February 2017 Hague draft also makes some matters subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of one state. These by and large correspond to matters that Canadian common law rules also regard as within one country's exclusive jurisdiction. The Moçambique rule is present, though in a narrower form. in the country where an immovable is situated can rule directly on rights in rem in the immovable, 33 but that rule does not extend to personal claims relating to such property. 34 An area in which the Special Commission reached no consensus in February 2017 was how to deal with judgments on intellectual property (IP) rights. The February 2017 draft, unlike the 2016 draft, has a bracketed provision that would exclude judgments on IP rights from the scope of the convention altogether, possibly subject to an exception, separately bracketed, for judgments based on copyright or other non-registered rights. 35 There is a further bracketed provision that would exclude the enforcement of non-monetary judgments in IP matters even if monetary damage awards in such matters were within the convention. 36 .
Alternative provisions assume that some or all IP judgments will be included in the convention's scope. They grapple with the issue of territoriality. It has long been the general view that jurisdiction in an infringement action, or some other action in which the validity of the IP right is in issue, is strictly territorial in the sense that only the state whose IP right is in question can adjudicate on the validity or infringement of the right. The current of opinion has moved away from this position in relation to copyright and other rights that do not depend on registration, because there is no impingement, even arguably, on the state's sovereignty by a foreign court's deciding on such rights. 37 Because a foreign decision on a registered right arguably does involve the sovereignty of the state of registration, the territoriality principle remains more solidly in place-but not unchallengeably so -for rights like patents and trademarks, which mostly do depend on registration.
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The 2016 Hague draft would have applied the territoriality principle to judgments ruling on the registration or validity of a registered right. 39 The distinction between the territorial implications of the two types of IP right is why art 2(1)(l) (supra note 35) contemplates that the convention might include judgments on copyright and other non-registered rights even if it otherwise excludes IP rights from its scope.
39
"Ruling on" would presumably include deciding on the validity of the right as part of a judgment for infringement.
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Under another bracketed provision in the February 2017 Hague draft, art 5(1)(k), a judgment of the state of registration for infringement of a registered patent, trademark or other listed intellectual property right would be enforceable without any other basis of jurisdiction being present, but the draft added (compared with 2016) judgments from a country other than that of registration even if one of the other grounds of jurisdiction was present, like the defendant's habitual residence in that country. 41 However, in its February 2017 draft the Special Commission put brackets around this provision, raising the possibility that judgments from states other than that of registration might be encompassed in the obligation to enforce. 42 In the case of copyright and other non-registered rights (assuming they were not excluded from the convention's scope), a judgment based on any of the convention's jurisdictional grounds would be enforceable, regardless of whether the copyright or other right in question was governed by the law of the state of origin or a different state. 
4.
TERRITORIAL COMPETENCE
General
In this part of the paper I will review the various heads of territorial competence under the CJPTA from the point of view of how far they correspond to the jurisdictional criteria that feature in the February 2017 Hague draft. As already mentioned, I will also make occasional comparisons to the "direct jurisdiction" provisions in the 1999 and 2001 Hague drafts.
A point that needs to be made at the outset is that the rules for domestic jurisdiction, which is what the CJPTA deals with, need not correspond to the rules that determine the jurisdiction of a foreign court for the purpose of foreign judgments, which is what the Hague judgments convention would deal with. The law may allow domestic courts to take jurisdiction on a ground that would not be recognized as giving a foreign court jurisdiction. (The reverse would not normally be true.) This is especially so if the domestic jurisdictional system includes a discretion to decline jurisdiction, on forum non conveniens or other grounds. If the exercise of jurisdiction is tempered by such a discretion, the grounds for jurisdiction can be more broadly drawn. But in the case of foreign judgments, where there is typically no discretion to the qualification, itself separately bracketed, "unless the defendant has not acted in that State [the state of registration] to initiate or further the infringement, or their activity cannot reasonably be seen as having been targeted at that State". The latter proviso probably reflects United States due process concerns if jurisdiction is based solely on the fact that the right infringed was that of the state of origin.
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2016 Hague draft, supra note 18, art 6(a). Enforcement under national law would not be an option because the exclusive jurisdiction provisions in art 6 would apply even if national law was to the contrary (art 16 of the 2016 draft, carried forward into art 17 of the February 2017 draft, supra note 19).
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February 2017 Hague draft, ibid, art 6(a). It is clear that a judgment from outside the country of registration could not have in rem effects, such as invalidating the registration, but it could be binding between the parties in personam.
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Art 6(a) of the February 2017 Hague draft, referred to supra note 41, is limited to judgments on IP rights that are required to be granted or registered, which would not apply to copyright or other unregistered rights. However, in art 7(1)(g) (bracketed), the draft would allow states optionally to refuse to enforce a judgment for infringement of an IP right if the court applied to that right a law other than the law governing the right. The fact that the law of the state of origin governed the right in question would be a distinct head of jurisdiction under two bracketed provisions in the February 2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, art 5(1)(l) and (m), which deal with judgments on the ownership or subsistence (para (l)) or infringement (para (m)) of copyright or other non-registered rights. As with judgments for infringement of registered rights (see supra note 40), there is a separately bracketed qualification in para (m) that would exclude infringement judgments in which the defendant did not act in, or direct its activities towards, the state in question.
decline to recognize or enforce, it may be appropriate to frame the grounds for the foreign court's jurisdiction more narrowly.
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With very few exceptions, the CJPTA grounds for territorial competence are broader than the corresponding jurisdictional grounds in the Hague drafts. The CJPTA generally tracks the Canadian common law as it stood in the early 1990s, when the Uniform Law Conference of Canada prepared the act. The common law on jurisdiction has since evolved in two ways. First, in assumed jurisdiction, meaning in personam jurisdiction as against a defendant who is not present in the province, 45 Canadian law, in Club Resorts, 46 adopted the analytical device of presumptive connecting factors (PCFs). Second, in presence-based jurisdiction, the Supreme Court of Canada, in Chevron, 47 clarified that the evolution of the Canadian common law in the last 25 years has left untouched the common law rule that mere presence is enough to found jurisdiction. From this it follows that an individual's presence in the province need not meet any test of substantiality. It also follows that, as was specifically held in Chevron, a corporation's constructive presence, through carrying on business in the province, is fully equivalent to the physical presence of an individual. It supports jurisdiction in any claim against the corporation, regardless of whether the claim has anything to do with the defendant's activities in the province.
These developments have, if anything, opened up something of a gap between the common law and the CJPTA, leaving the CJPTA sitting closer to the Hague standards than the Canadian common law now does. In cases of assumed jurisdiction, common law PCFs are now in some respects much wider than the presumed real and substantial connections listed in the CJPTA. 48 True, the expansive tendency of the common law may filter into the CJPTA via the use of the "residual" real and substantial connection. However, the "residual" connection is an avenue that courts in the CJPTA provinces have not been inclined to open up much until now, and they will not necessarily change this stance just because, in the non-CJPTA provinces, some PCFs are more liberal than the CJPTA presumptions.
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In cases of presence-based jurisdiction, a clear gap exists in relation to individuals because the CJPTA chose to make ordinary residence, rather than presence, the test. There is no significant gap as far as 44 In theory Canadian law since 1990 has treated the scope of domestic jurisdiction and the scope of a foreign court's jurisdiction as correlatives by applying the "real and substantial connection" criterion to both: Morguard Investments Ltd v De Savoye, [1990 ] 3 SCR 1077 at 1094 Beals v Saldanha, 2003 SCC 72, [2003 3 SCR 416 at paras 37-38, 84, 202. The principle of correlativity applies in a system constructed that like that of the European Brussels I Regulation (recast), Reg (EU) No 1215/2012. It is not axiomatic in relation to a common law system, and the difficulties posed by it have never been fully examined by Canadian courts. Chevron, supra note 45.
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For example, the PCF, for the purpose of a tort claim, that the claim is connected with a contract that was made in the province. This PCF was applied in Lapointe Rosenstein Marchand Melançon LLP v Cassels Brock & Blackwell LLP, 2016 SCC 30 [Lapointe] . This case actually relied on the presumptive connecting factor of a contract made in the jurisdiction as supporting jurisdiction in a tort action, but the result suggests the court may lean in favour a retention of "necessary or proper party" as a ground for jurisdiction simpliciter. One decision has already accepted it as a PCF: Geophysical Service Inc v Arcis Seismic Solutions Corp, 2015 ABQB 88, 20 Alta LR (6th) 112. claims against a corporation are concerned, because the CJPTA's definition of ordinary residence for a corporation 50 encompassed the common law criterion of carrying on business in the province, later affirmed in Chevron.
In reviewing the CJPTA criteria for territorial competence, I have indicated at the start of each discussion whether I think a judgment of a Canadian court that took jurisdiction on that ground would be "Hague compliant" in the sense of meeting the jurisdictional standards in the February 2017 Hague draft. The answer usually is sometimes, in a few cases it is always, and in some cases it is never.
Consent

Defendant sued on counterclaim
Sometimes Hague compliant. The CJPTA gives territorial competence whenever the defendant is sued on a counterclaim to a proceeding in which that person is plaintiff. 51 The February 2017 Hague draft qualifies the enforceability of a judgment on such a counterclaim. To the extent that the counterclaim succeeded, the judgment is enforceable only if the counterclaim arose out of the same transaction or occurrence as the claim.
52 This is a qualification not present in the CJPTA. Whether a counterclaim can be brought if it arises out of an unrelated transaction depends on the local rules. It does appear likely that some counterclaims that would fit under the CJPTA rule would not meet the "same transaction or occurrence" test, as when the defendant in a contract action counterclaims based on an unrelated debt that the plaintiff owes the defendant.
Submission in the course of proceedings
Sometimes Hague compliant. The expression used in the CJPTA provision 53 is that the defendant "submits to the court's jurisdiction" in the course of the proceeding. This must be compared with the combination of two jurisdictional grounds in the February 2017 Hague draft. One says, "expressly consented to the jurisdiction of the court of origin in the course of the proceedings".
54 This is narrower than the CJPTA provision because submission in the Canadian sense can take place by conduct that implicitly accepts the jurisdiction of the court without clearly qualifying as "express consent". The Hague grounds also include one that the Special Commission added to the Working Group's draft in 2016 55 and 50 CJPTA (BC), supra note 1, s 7(c). There may be nuances; at common law someone like an incorporated consultant could carry on business in the jurisdiction without necessarily having a fixed place of business in the jurisdiction. On the other hand, the court in Chevron, supra note 45 at para 85, emphasized that courts consistently found "maintenance of physical business premises to be a compelling jurisdictional factor". revised in February 2017. 56 This is that the defendant "argued on the merits before the court of origin without contesting jurisdiction within the timeframe provided in the law of the State of origin, unless it is evident that an objection to jurisdiction or to the exercise of jurisdiction would not have succeeded under that law". 57 The expression "argued on the merits" covers most of the situations in which, according to the Canadian case law, a defendant implicitly accepts jurisdiction, but perhaps not all of them. 58 The very significant qualification that arguing on the merits does not give the court jurisdiction if the defendant had no viable way to contest jurisdiction has no equivalent in Canadian law.
It is worth noting that the February 2017 Hague draft would restrict the "express consent" ground to consent that "was addressed to the court, orally or in writing", if the person said to be bound by the judgment is a consumer being sued on a consumer contract or an employee being sued on an employment contract. 
Agreement that the court has jurisdiction
To avoid overlap between the 2005 Choice of Court Convention and the general judgments convention, the February 2017 Hague draft does not deal with submission under an exclusive choice of court agreement, which is the preserve of the 2005 convention.
60 Any agreement designating a court or courts of one contracting state is deemed to be exclusive unless the parties expressly provide otherwise.
61 A court designated in a valid exclusive choice of court agreement has jurisdiction and cannot decline it in favour of a court in another state. 62 A judgment of a court that is exclusively chosen must be recognized and enforced, 63 subject only to fairly standard defences such as fraud and public policy.
64
Where jurisdiction was taken on the basis of a non-exclusive choice of court agreement, recognition and enforcement are mandatory under the Choice of Court Convention only if both the state of origin and the requested state have made declarations that they are prepared to recognize and enforce judgments where jurisdiction is taken on such a basis. 65 A state that signs on to the proposed judgments convention will, however, bind itself to enforce a judgment "given by a court designated in an agreement concluded or 56 February 2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, art 5(1)(f). The 2016 version, which was in brackets, used "entered an appearance" rather than "argued on the merits".
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February 2017 Hague draft, ibid, art 5(1)(f).
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As when the defendant writes the court a letter responding to the notice of the proceeding, as the Thivys did in Beals v Saldanha, 2003 SCC 72, [2003 69 have been applied for many years by Canadian courts, especially in family matters, and they are generally treated as equivalent. Assuming that they are, a judgment in any case in which territorial competence was based on an individual's ordinary residence will comply with the habitual residence criterion in the February 2017 Hague draft.
The 1999 Hague draft (the mixed convention) also used habitual residence as the basic jurisdictional test, 70 and specifically prohibited jurisdiction based on the defendant's temporary residence or presence in the state. 71 The negotiations the following year showed disagreement on whether the term used should be residence or habitual residence, 72 and in case residence were to be chosen, a bracketed provision was inserted to select the state of principal residence if there was one. 
Corporations and other entities
Sometimes Hague compliant. The CJPTA follows the common law tradition of treating a corporation as present in the province if it does business or has an agent for service there. Because the Hague model, following the civil law pattern, makes habitual residence, not presence, the basic ground for personal jurisdiction, the test for corporate habitual residence is aimed at selecting only the state or states (a corporation, like an individual, can have more than one habitual residence) in which the corporation is in some sense based. 74 The criteria have been the same throughout the Hague projects since the 1999 draft. A corporation is habitually resident in a state if it has its statutory seat there, was incorporated there, had its central administration there, or had its principal place of business there. 76 Only one of these, the place of central administration, is also used in the CJPTA. 77 The CJPTA uses three other alternative criteria that would usually not make the corporation habitually resident in the Hague sense: being required by law to have a registered office in the province; having, pursuant to law, registered an address or an agent in the province for service of process; and having a place of business in the province.
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The four Hague criteria apply not only to corporations but also to an "entity or person other than a natural person", like unincorporated associations and partnerships. 79 The CJPTA deals separately with them, again regarding them as ordinarily resident if, among other things, they have a place of business or, if they do not do business, a place where they conduct their activities in the province.
80 They would not be habitually resident on the Hague test on that basis alone.
The Hague model, again by analogy with individuals, treats jurisdiction as against a corporation or other entity that is not habitually resident in the state, but does have a presence there, as assumed jurisdiction. Under the February 2017 draft, if a defendant maintains a branch, agency or other establishment 81 in the state of origin at the time the defendant becomes a party to the proceeding, there is jurisdiction if the claim on which the judgment is based arose out of the activities of that branch, agency or other establishment. 82 This, of course, is the qualification that the Supreme Court of Canada refused, in the Chevron case, to add to jurisdiction based on a corporation's presence in the province. 
Assumed jurisdiction -presumed real and substantial connection
From the point of view of the enforceability of an eventual judgment, the assumed jurisdiction grounds come into play only if the defendant does not submit to the jurisdiction. The CJPTA, following the Morguard principle, adopted the real and substantial connection as the sine qua non of assumed But it is included in the Civil Code of Québec: art 3148(2).
jurisdiction. 84 The overwhelming majority of cases are taken care of by the listed categories of presumed real and substantial connection. 85 Of the twelve paragraphs of the list, four deal with subject matter that is largely or entirely excluded from the scope of the February 2017 Hague draft, and was also excluded from the drafts of the 1999 and 2001 mixed convention drafts.
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A fifth paragraph, which presumes there to be a real and substantial connection if the proceeding is for the enforcement of a judgment or arbitral award from outside the province, 87 does not feature in the February 2017 Hague draft because the latter is confined to enforcing judgments in the sense of a decision on the merits, 88 not judgments that enforce other judgments or awards. Jurisdiction in foreign judgment proceedings was touched on in the mixed convention drafts, not by specifying when a court had jurisdiction in such proceedings -that was left by silence to national law -but by stipulating in the "black list" of prohibited grounds that a judgment creditor's bringing such a proceeding in a state would not give that state's court jurisdiction in a matter not directly related to the enforcement proceeding.
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I will review the remaining seven paragraphs briefly, indicating how far the jurisdictional bases will fit the criteria in the February 2017 Hague draft.
Rights in property in the province
Sometimes Hague compliant. The CJPTA gives territorial competence against a non-resident defendant if the proceeding "is brought to enforce, assert, declare or determine proprietary or possessory rights or a security interest in property in British Columbia that is movable or immovable". 90 The February 2017 Hague draft recognizes no jurisdiction based on the claim having to do with rights in movable property situated within the state. 91 There are two provisions relating to claims to rights in immovables. One recognizes jurisdiction if a judgment rules on a tenancy of immovable property in the state of origin.
92
The other is the provision, already referred to, 93 that gives the court of the situs exclusive jurisdiction to 84 CJPTA (BC), supra note 1, s 3(e).
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Ibid, s 10.
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The four are CJPTA (BC), ibid, s 10(b) and (c), which are concerned with matters of succession (though (c) may apply to some inter vivos transactions); s 10(j), on status and capacity of a natural person; and s 10(l) on recovery of taxes. rule on rights in rem in immovable property. 94 The CJPTA's "proprietary or possessory rights" in an immovable would cover claims to in rem rights and tenancies, as would claims to a security interest in an immovable that amounts to an right in rem because it is an interest in the land. 95 There may be some types of security interests in immovables that are within the CJPTA presumption but outside the Hague criteria because they are not rights in rem.
Trusts
Sometimes Hague compliant. Both the CJPTA and the February 2017 Hague draft have fairly elaborate provisions about jurisdiction relating to trusts. They overlap but do not coincide. The Hague provision is limited to trusts "created voluntarily and evidenced in writing", 96 whereas the CJPTA paragraph applies to any trust, including one imposed by law or created orally.
To take the four CJPTA grounds in turn, the first is that relief against a trustee (wherever resident) is claimed only as to trust assets, whether movable or immovable, in the province.
97 This is not a ground under the February 2017 Hague draft. The second is that the trustee is ordinarily resident in the province. 98 This would be covered, I think, by the general February 2017 Hague draft provision that "the person against whom recognition or enforcement is sought was habitually resident" in the state of origin. 99 The third is that the administration of the trust is principally carried on in the province. 100 This would usually correspond to the Hague criterion that the trust instrument expressly or impliedly designates the state of origin as the state in which the principal place of administration of the trust is situated. 101 The Hague provision refers to where the principal administration should take place according to the trust document, whereas the CJPTA one refers to where it actually takes place. The fourth CJPTA ground is that by the express terms of a trust document, the trust is governed by the law of the province.
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The corresponding Hague ground is actually wider, because it recognizes jurisdiction if the law of the state of origin was expressly or impliedly designated as the governing law.
103 It is also more precise, because it caters to trusts governed by more than one law. It refers to the law designated as governing the February 2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, art 5(1)(n)(ii). A bracketed proviso, which was not present in the 2016 draft, would not recognize the governing law as a basis of jurisdiction if the defendant's activities in relation to the trust "clearly did not constitute a purposeful and substantial connection to that State", another instance of American due process concerns about basing jurisdiction purely on abstract legal connections; compare supra note 40 (law governing an IP right); infra note 116 and accompanying text (place of performance of contract). aspect of the trust that is the subject of the litigation, whereas the CJPTA refers only to the law designated as governing the trust as a whole.
In one of the rare instances of the Hague jurisdictional criteria covering a situation the CJPTA presumptions do not cover, the February 2017 Hague draft recognizes a judgment if the state of origin was designated in the trust instrument as a state (not necessarily the only state) in which disputes about such matters are to be determined. 104 Even though this exact ground is not in the CJPTA, in almost every case where a trust did say that disputes about the trust could be litigated in the province, it seems more than likely that one or other of the existing CJPTA presumptions would give territorial competence (place of administration, express choice of governing law, etc.).
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The 1999 Hague draft had one other ground relating to trusts, which was that a court would have jurisdiction if the trust had its closest connection with the forum state. 106 The 2001 version expanded this by adding some factors to be taken into account in determining the closest connection.
107 It also added a further jurisdictional ground, which was that the settlor, if living, and all living beneficiaries were all habitually resident in the forum state. 
Contractual obligations
Sometimes Hague compliant. The CJPTA has only two general jurisdictional presumptions relating to contractual obligations. 109 Territorial competence exists if the contractual obligations with which the proceeding is concerned were, to a substantial extent, to be performed in the province. 110 It also exists if, by its express terms, the contract is governed by the law of the province. 111 There is a third presumption relating specifically to consumer contracts, meaning contracts for the purchase of property or services for use other than in the course of the purchaser's trade or profession.
112 Territorial competence is presumed to exist if the contract resulted from a solicitation of business in the province on behalf of the seller.
104
Ibid, art 5(1)(n)(i).
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And there is always the "residual" real and substantial connection if there is an express choice of a forum in the province for trust disputes, but none of the existing presumptions applies. 106 1999 Hague draft, supra note 11, art 11(2)(c).
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2001 Hague draft, supra note 12, art 11(2)(c).
108
Ibid, art 11(2)(d).
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Saskatchewan has a third, namely, that the contract was made in Saskatchewan: CJPTA (SK), supra note 1, s 9(d)(ii). This may be because the Saskatchewan version of the act followed an earlier ULCC draft than the final one; see Black et al, supra note 1 at 35-36. The place of contracting has (unfortunately, in my view) attracted the Supreme Court of Canada, which declared it to be a presumptive connecting factor even in tort cases, if the tort was connected with the contract: Club Resorts, supra note 46; Lapointe, supra note 48. The place of signing a contract was on the "black list" in the 1999 Hague draft, supra note 11, art 18(1)(j).
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CJPTA (BC), supra note 1, s 10(e)(i).
111
Ibid, s 10(e)(ii).
112
Ibid, s 10(e)(iii)(A).
113
Ibid, s 10(e)(iii)(B).
The February 2017 Hague draft also recognizes jurisdiction based on where a contract was or should have been performed, but without the "to a substantial extent" qualification. Performance of the obligation in issue must have taken place, or ought to have taken place, in the forum state. 114 The draft does, however, add another qualification, unusual in that it savours of American law and is probably directed at due process concerns. 115 The fact that the forum state was the place of performance does not give jurisdiction if "the defendant's activities in relation to the transaction clearly did not constitute a purposeful and substantial connection to that state". 116 This wording was in the Working Group's draft; the group suggested that the use of "purposeful" might need further elaboration and discussion by the Special Commission, 117 but the latter left the wording alone. 118 The 1999 and 2001 drafts were quite different. The first had a rule based strictly on the place of performance. 119 The second had added an alternative version based on the contract being "directly related" to "frequent [and] [or] significant activity" in the state.
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Whether to include "activity jurisdiction" was one of the main sticking-points in the 2000-01 negotiations.
Assumed jurisdiction based on the contract's being governed by the law of the state of origin does not exist under the February 2017 Hague draft.
It is worth noting that there is a specific provision, in brackets, that could have been designed for the Morguard case; the court had jurisdiction if the judgment ruled on a contractual obligation secured by a right in rem in immovable property in the state, if the claim was brought together with a claim relating to that right.
121
The February 2017 draft provides that assumed jurisdiction based on the place of performance does not exist if the person sought to be bound is a consumer or an employee.
122 This is one of only two places in which the 2016 draft deals with the special jurisdictional problems relating to contract actions brought against consumers and employees. 123 The 1999 draft, no doubt influenced by the Brussels model, had special jurisdictional rules for both categories of contract, dealing with actions brought by, as well as against, the consumer or employee. 124 The 
Restitutionary obligations
Never Hague compliant. The February 2017 Hague draft has no provision recognizing jurisdiction based on the place where restitutionary obligations arose, that would analogous to the presumption in the CJPTA. 126 There is a jurisdictional principle based on where a non-contractual obligation arose, 127 but that provision, discussed immediately below, is limited to claims for physical injury. The mixed convention drafts did not have a provision for restitutionary claims, either.
Tort
Sometimes Hague compliant. The CJPTA presumes territorial competence, based on a real and substantial connection, if the proceeding concerns a tort committed in the province. Canadian law has been especially liberal when it comes to assumed jurisdiction in tort claims. The locus of the tort, for jurisdictional purposes, can be in any place that was substantially affected by the defendant's activities or its consequences, the law of which is likely to have been in the reasonable contemplation of the parties.
128
In Club Resorts 129 and Lapointe, 130 the Supreme Court of Canada went beyond the CJPTA when it held that jurisdiction in a tort claim could be based, not on where the tort was committed, but on the place of making of a contract with which the tort was connected, the notion of "connection" being a flexible one.
The February 2017 Hague draft, by sharp contrast, is very conservative when it comes to assumed jurisdiction in tort claims. It eschews economic claims altogether, thus cutting out (among others) almost all negligent or fraudulent misrepresentation claims, the locus of which, for jurisdictional purposes, is often litigated in Canada.
131 (The exclusion of defamation claims, another fertile source of jurisdictional disputes in Canadian courts, was referred to earlier.
132 ) It also settles firmly on a place of acting test. The rule recognizes only judgments based on a "non-contractual obligation arising from death, physical injury, damage to or loss of tangible property, [if] The 2001 draft included another provision, bracketed, that parallels the activity-based ground proposed for jurisdiction in contract claims. 137 Jurisdiction could be based on the defendant's having "engaged in frequent or significant activity" in the forum state if the tort claim arose out of that activity. 138 
Business carried on
Sometimes Hague compliant. The CJPTA presumes territorial competence if the proceeding concerns a business carried on in the province. 139 This ground is not often needed when it comes to suing a corporation, because the CJPTA's tests for the ordinary residence of a corporation include the fact that the corporation had a place of business in the province. So this presumption comes into play only if the claim concerns a business carried on in the province by a corporation that does not have a "place" of business there and is not otherwise ordinarily resident there, or a business carried on by an individual who is ordinarily resident elsewhere. The February 2017 Hague draft does not recognize jurisdiction on the basis of a corporation's doing business other than through a branch, agency or other establishment. 140 It does have a provision for jurisdiction based on a natural person's having his or her principal place of business (not just a place of business) in the forum state, if the claim arose out of the business done there. 
Injunction
Never Hague compliant. The CJPTA presumes there to be a real and substantial connection if the plaintiff claims an injunction ordering a party to do or refrain from doing anything in the province, or in relation to immovable or movable property in the province. 142 The February 2017 Hague draft has no 134 Supra note 128.
135
Club Resorts, supra note 46. In neither of the two cases decided in Club Resorts was jurisdiction taken based on the tort having been committed in Ontario, and so they would not have fitted under the CJPTA presumption. They could have been cases where a "residual" real and substantial connection might be shown.
136
1999 Hague draft, supra note 11, art 10(1).
137
See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 2001 Hague draft, supra note 12, art 10(2). The provision would also have required that "the overall connection of the defendant to that state makes it reasonable that the defendant be subject to suit in that state".
139
CJPTA (BC), supra note 1, s 10(h).
140
See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
Assumed jurisdiction -residual real and substantial connection
Using the February 2017 Hague draft as the basis for comparison, there would be very few Hague compliant bases of jurisdiction that would lie outside one or other of the CJPTA's listed presumptions and so could be applied on the basis of a residual (affirmatively shown) real and substantial connection. These would include most of the jurisdictional grounds relating to IP rights that are based solely on the law governing the right. 145 It would be rare, though not impossible, for such claims to find their way into the court of a province as distinct from the Federal Court, and so the CJPTA would practically never be involved. 
Assumed jurisdiction -forum of necessity
None of the Hague drafts included the concept of forum of necessity, which is understandable, given that it is controversial even within a legal system like Canada's. A judgment based on the CJPTA forum of necessity provision 147 would not be Hague compliant.
DECLINING JURISDICTION
Forum non conveniens
It is worth noting briefly the extent to which the CJPTA's forum non conveniens provisions 148 fit into the Hague discussions. For obvious reasons the February 2017 Hague draft, which is concerned only with recognition and enforcement of judgments, does not touch on declining jurisdiction. The discretion to decline jurisdiction is generally not a significant part of the jurisdictional system in civil law countries, and does not form part of the Brussels system. Nevertheless it was included in the 1999 Hague draft for the mixed convention. That draft convention would have permitted a court in a contracting state, in "exceptional circumstances", to suspend its proceedings if it was "clearly inappropriate" for the court to 143 Injunctions are within the range of judgments recognized or enforced under the proposed convention. It includes a "decree or order" within the scope of "judgment": February 2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, art 3(1)(b). The injunction would have to be a permanent one, given after a decision on the merits; the same provision states that interim measures of protection are not included.
144
See 1999 Hague draft, supra note 11, art 13. In the 2001 Hague draft, supra note 12, opinion was divided on whether the convention should exclude provisional and protective measures from its scope altogether or, as the 1999 draft had proposed. specifically provide for jurisdiction to order protective measures that have effect only within state of the court that orders them, and are designed to protect a claim on the merits. See art 1(2)(k) and art 13, Alternatives A and B. One cases where copyright infringement claims were brought against non-resident defendants, although in a non-CJPTA province, was Geophysical Service Inc v Arcis Seismic Solutions Corp, supra note 48.
147
CJPTA (BC), supra note 1, s 6. The forum of necessity section was omitted in the CJPTA (SK), supra note 1; see Black et al, supra note 1 at 174-77.
148
Ibid, s 11. exercise jurisdiction and another state's court was "clearly more appropriate to resolve the dispute". If the other court took jurisdiction, the first court would then decline jurisdiction. 149 This provision survived almost intact into the 2001 draft. 150 The references to "exceptional circumstances" and "clearly inappropriate" seems to make the standard for declining jurisdiction somewhat higher than the CJPTA's. 151 Even the alternative forum's being "clearly more appropriate" is stricter than the CJPTA's "more appropriate", 152 although the common law has sanctified the "clearly more appropriate" test and courts tend to equate the CJPTA test with it.
153
Parallel proceedings
The CJPTA, like the common law, has no principle of lis alibi pendens. The forum non conveniens provisions of the CJPTA therefore apply to cases in which proceedings on the same matter between the same parties have been brought elsewhere, as the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed in the Teck case.
154
Because it only proposes a recognition and enforcement convention, the February 2017 Hague draft does not have to deal with lis alibi pendens. It does, however, have a provision permitting the requested state to refuse or postpone recognition or enforcement of a foreign judgment that is otherwise entitled to it, if proceedings between the same parties on the subject matter are pending before a court in that state, provided that the local court was seized before the court of origin and there is a close connection between the dispute and the requested state. 155 The Permanent Bureau's commentary notes that jurisdictions differ on whether a pending local proceeding is pre-empted by a foreign judgment that is entitled to recognition.
156 Hence this provision is worded in permissive rather than mandatory terms. February 2017 Hague draft, supra note 19, art 7(2). The Working Group's draft also provided that recognition could be refused or postponed, even if the dispute were not closely connected with the requested state, if the proceedings before the court of origin were "brought for the purpose of frustrating the effectiveness of the pending proceedings": Working Group draft, supra note 17, art 7(2)(b). The Special Commission deleted this part of article 7(2).
156
April 2016 Explanatory Note, supra note 17, at para 171. In notes 81 and 82, Québec and Saskatchewan are listed as jurisdictions favouring the local proceeding whereas the other Canadian jurisdictions are listed as favouring recognition of the foreign judgment.
The 1999 draft for the mixed convention included a rule that the court second seized must suspend jurisdiction in favour of the court first seized, 157 subject to two exceptions. One is where the action in the court first seized is for a determination that the plaintiff has no obligation to the defendant whereas the action in the other court seeks substantive relief; in that case the court first seized must suspend the proceedings. 158 The other is where the court first seized, on application by a party, determines that the court second seized is clearly more appropriate to resolve the dispute. 159 The article would not allow, as in Teck, the court second seized to refuse to decline jurisdiction because it itself is clearly the more appropriate forum. The article survived into the 2001 draft with only minor amendments.
CONCLUSION
The short answer to the question, whether the CJPTA's rules will cause difficulty if a Hague Convention on foreign judgments comes into force along the lines of the February 2017 draft, is no. The CJPTA's jurisdictional rules are in many respects wider than the jurisdictional grounds recognized in the Hague draft, but that would not prevent judgments from being recognized under the convention if the facts brought the judgment within the Hague grounds. If recognition and enforcement abroad is important to the parties, they can usually know in advance whether the judgment would be Hague compliant.
There would be little reason to narrow the jurisdictional grounds in the CJPTA in an attempt to bring it closer to a Hague compliant jurisdictional system. There would be no real benefit in terms of certainty of operation of the CJPTA itself; the existing CJPTA seems to be working reasonably predictably. Nor would it gain wider acceptance for our judgments abroad, since the recognition and enforcement convention, like the common law, does not make jurisdiction depend on the ground on which the foreign court actually took jurisdiction but on whether the ground was present in fact. The cost of a disparity between the CJPTA jurisdictional system and a Hague system is that litigants who care about recognition or enforcement of a judgment elsewhere cannot rely on the CJPTA's grounds as a guarantee that a judgment will be effective abroad. However, this is the present situation and, Hague or no Hague, we will almost certainly have to keep living with it.
Two other considerations come into play as well. One, which relates to a point that was referred to earlier, 160 is that the domestic jurisdictional grounds are structured as they are because they include a robust discretion to decline jurisdiction on the basis of forum non conveniens. To recast the grounds along the lines of the grounds in the Hague judgments convention would ignore this fundamental structural feature. The other consideration is that one of the main roles of the CJPTA is to define jurisdiction vis-à-vis other provinces. This the CJPTA does, following in a reasonable way the constitutional limits on jurisdiction -fairly conservatively interpreted, as it now turns out. To narrow the CJPTA jurisdictional grounds under the influence of a Hague Convention would therefore, in a sense, put the international cart before the interprovincial horse. 1999 Hague draft, supra note 11, art 21(1). The court first seised must be "expected to render a judgment capable of being recognized" under the convention.
158
Ibid, art 21(6).
159
Ibid, art 21(7).
160
Supra note 44 and accompanying text. It is hard to imagine any scenario in which the Hague system and the common law jurisdictional systems of which the CJPTA is part will be brought close enough together to allow them to merge into one dovetailed whole. Even if a Hague Convention on jurisdiction, separate from the recognition and enforcement of judgments convention currently being negotiated, comes to pass it will almost certainly leave states free to use jurisdictional grounds that do not comply with the "white list" in the convention. There may or may not be an agreed "black list" of prohibited grounds of jurisdiction. Even if the black list in the 1999 Hague draft 162 were to be replicated in a new convention, it would not ban any of the grounds of assumed jurisdiction listed as presumed real and substantial connections in the CJPTA. 163 It is possible that such a convention could require some adjustments, probably not radical ones, to forum non conveniens and lis alibi pendens rules. Very probably, therefore, the CJPTA could function perfectly well even if Canada became a party to an eventual Hague jurisdiction convention.
Disparities between the CJPTA and the Hague system, whatever it may become, seem to me less of a concern than the growing disparities, as a result of the evolution of the common law, between the CJPTA and non-CJPTA systems within Canada. The Supreme Court of Canada's desire, as expressed in Club Resorts, 164 to harmonize the two as far as possible seems to have faded, 165 to the detriment of the Canadian jurisdictional system as a whole. Except Saskatchewan's presumption based on the place a contract is made; see supra note 109.
164 Supra note 46. 165 As evidenced most notably in the Lapointe case, supra note 48, expanding considerably a presumptive jurisdictional ground (the place of making of a contract) that was deliberately omitted in the CJPTA. enforcement may be refused only on the grounds specified in this Convention.
2.
Without prejudice to such review as is necessary for the application of the provisions of this Chapter, there shall be no review of the merits of the judgment given by the court of origin.
3.
A judgment shall be recognised only if it has effect in the State of origin, and shall be enforced only if it is enforceable in the State of origin.
4.
If a judgment referred to in paragraph 3 is the subject of review in the State of origin or if the time limit for seeking ordinary review has not expired, the court addressed may - A refusal under sub-paragraph (c) does not prevent a subsequent application for recognition or enforcement of the judgment.
Article 5 Bases for recognition and enforcement
1.
A judgment is eligible for recognition and enforcement if one of the following requirements is met -(a) the person against whom recognition or enforcement is sought was habitually resident in the State of origin at the time that person became a party to the proceedings in the court of origin;
(b) the natural person against whom recognition or enforcement is sought had his or her principal place of business in the State of origin at the time that person became a party to the proceedings in the court of origin and the claim on which the judgment is based arose out of the activities of that business; (c) the person against whom recognition or enforcement is sought is the person that brought the claim, other than a counterclaim, on which the judgment is based;
(d) the defendant maintained a branch, agency, or other establishment without separate legal personality in the State of origin at the time that person became a party to the proceedings in the court of origin, and the claim on which the judgment is based arose out of the activities of that branch, agency, or establishment;
(e) the defendant expressly consented to the jurisdiction of the court of origin in the course of the proceedings in which the judgment was given;
(f) the defendant argued on the merits before the court of origin without contesting jurisdiction within the timeframe provided in the law of the State of origin, unless it is evident that an objection to jurisdiction or to the exercise of jurisdiction would not have succeeded under that law; and -(i) at the time the proceedings were instituted, the State of origin was designated in the trust instrument as a State in which disputes about such matters are to be determined;
(ii) the law of the State of origin is expressly or impliedly designated in the trust instrument as the law governing the aspect of the trust that is the subject of the litigation that gave rise to the judgment[, unless the defendant's activities in relation to the trust clearly did not constitute a purposeful and substantial connection to that State]; or (iii) at the time the proceedings were instituted, the State of origin was expressly or impliedly designated in the trust instrument as the State in which the principal place of administration of the trust is situated. designated in the trust instrument as a State in which disputes about such matters are to be determined;
This sub-paragraph only applies to judgments regarding internal aspects of a trust between persons who are or were within the trust relationship;
(o) the judgment ruled on a counterclaim -(i) to the extent that it was in favour of the counterclaimant, provided that the counterclaim arose out of the same transaction or occurrence as the claim
(ii) to the extent that it was against the counterclaimant, unless the law of the State of origin required the counterclaim to be filed in order to avoid preclusion; (p) the judgment was given by a court designated in an agreement concluded or documented in writing or by any other means of communication which renders information accessible so as to be usable for subsequent reference, other than an exclusive choice of court agreement.
For the purposes of this sub-paragraph, an "exclusive choice of court agreement" means an agreement concluded by two or more parties that designates, for the purpose of deciding disputes which have arisen or may arise in connection with a particular legal relationship, the courts of one State or one or more specific courts of one State to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of any other courts.
2.
If recognition or enforcement is sought against a natural person acting primarily for personal, family or household purposes (a consumer) in matters relating to a consumer contract, or against an employee in matters relating to the employee's contract of employment -(a) paragraph 1(e) applies only if the consent was addressed to the court, orally or in writing;
(b) paragraph 1(f), (g) and (p) do not apply. (d) the proceedings in the court of origin were contrary to an agreement, or a designation in a trust instrument, under which the dispute in question was to be determined in a court other than the court of origin;
(e) the judgment is inconsistent with a judgment given in the requested State in a dispute between the same parties; or (f) the judgment is inconsistent with an earlier judgment given in another State between the same parties on the same subject matter, provided that the earlier judgment fulfills the conditions necessary for its recognition in the requested State;
[(g) the judgment ruled on an infringement of an intellectual property right, applying to that right a law other than the law governing that right.].
Recognition or enforcement may be refused or postponed if proceedings between the same parties on the same subject matter are pending before a court of the requested State, where -(a) the court of the requested State was seised before the court of origin; and (b) there is a close connection between the dispute and the requested State.
Recognition or enforcement of a severable part of a judgment shall be granted where recognition or enforcement of that part is applied for, or only part of the judgment is capable of being recognised or enforced under this Convention.
Article 11 Damages
1.
Recognition or enforcement of a judgment may be refused if, and to the extent that, the judgment awards damages, including exemplary or punitive damages, that do not compensate a party for actual loss or harm suffered.
2.
The court addressed shall take into account whether and to what extent the damages awarded by the court of origin serve to cover costs and expenses relating to the proceedings.
[Article 12
Non-monetary remedies in intellectual property matters
A judgment granting a remedy other than monetary damages in intellectual property matters shall not be enforced under this Convention.]
Article 13
Judicial settlements (transactions judiciaires) Judicial settlements (transactions judiciaires) which a court of a Contracting State has approved, or which have been concluded in the course of proceedings before a court of a Contracting State, and which are enforceable in the same manner as a judgment in the State of origin, shall be enforced under this Convention in the same manner as a judgment[, provided that such settlement is permissible under the law of the requested State].
Article 14 Documents to be produced
1.
The party seeking recognition or applying for enforcement shall produce -(a) a complete and certified copy of the judgment;
(b) if the judgment was given by default, the original or a certified copy of a document establishing that the document which instituted the proceedings or an equivalent document was notified to the defaulting party;
(c) any documents necessary to establish that the judgment has effect or, where applicable, is enforceable in the State of origin; (d) in the case referred to in Article 13, a certificate of a court of the State of origin that the judicial settlement or a part of it is enforceable in the same manner as a judgment in the State of origin.
extent that any inconsistencies exist between the above-mentioned treaty and this Convention, other Contracting States shall not be obliged to apply this Convention to a judgment which relates to that specific matter and which was rendered by a court of a Contracting State that made the declaration.
5.
This Convention shall not affect the application of the rules of a Regional Economic Integration Organisation that is a Party to this Convention, whether adopted before or after this Convention as concerns the recognition or enforcement of judgments as between Member States of the Regional Economic Integration Organisation.
[Chapter IV, Final Clauses, is omitted.]
